## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

ALEXANDRO PUGA, ET AL.,	) CASE NO: 2:15-CV-00073
Plaintiffs,	) CIVIL
vs.	) Corpus Christi, Texas
RCX SOLUTIONS, INC., ET AL.,	) Thursday, July 13, 2017 ) (8:58 a.m. to 10:04 a.m.)
Defendants.	)

TELEPHONIC STATUS CONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE NELVA GONZALES RAMOS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## **APPEARANCES:**

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MS. PARECKI:
                        The objection, your Honor, is that
Plaintiff's counsel is questioning the witness about statutory
employee under the DOT. The regulations don't say statutory
employer or statutory employee, they use the term employer and
employee. The statutory employer doctrine is a legal doctrine
that has arisen from the regulations for the purpose of
allowing the Courts to impose vicarious liability on an
authorized motor carrier for the negligence of a driver under
certain statutory defined circumstances when certain criteria
are met. So questioning a lay witness about a legal doctrine
arising out of regs when the regs don't even use that term is
improper questioning of the witness.
          THE COURT: Okay. I'm looking at Page 32, Line 21,
through Page 33, Line 9, correct?
          MS. PARECKI: I'm sorry, your Honor --
         MR. HUNNICUTT:
          MS. PARECKI: -- 33/21 through 34/9.
          THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry. Okay, okay.
Mr. Hunnicutt?
         MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes, your Honor. Actually I
disagree, not in terms of that it's not in the statute, but
it's a term of art in the industry and our expert also has
testified that that's the statutory -- that's what people call
it in the carriers. But my whole point on this and why it's
relevant is that this is the director of safety and I want to
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- 1 | would ratify the behavior and that would go to the issue of
- 2 | punitives, your Honor, which has already been dismissed
- 3 pursuant to our motion for summary judgment. Mr. Crump's
- 4 opinion as to whether or not talking on a hands-free cell phone
- 5 device is considered reckless driving is not a proper question.
- 6 The jury will determine whether or not there was negligence.
- 7 Again, recklessness, that goes to punitives, which are no
- 8 longer in the case.
- THE COURT: All right. Mr. Hunnicutt?
- 10 MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes, your Honor. This man is the
- 11 | safety director. I still have to prove up as part of the
- 12 underlying basis that Ronald Brown was negligent and if he's
- 13 | reckless the jury can certainly that in terms of whether that's
- 14 been reasonably proved. But even though the Court has granted
- 15 | their summary judgment on gross negligence, this is still
- 16 | relevant and important to the Plaintiffs' case to put on
- 17 evidence that Ron Brown was guilty of negligence that day. And
- 18 | that's something that the Defendants have not conceded and in
- 19 | fact they just -- or are trying to advance a proposed charge to
- 20 | submit my client's negligence.
- 21 THE COURT: All right, the Court's going to overrule
- 22 the objection.
- 23 Next?
- MR. HUNNICUTT: That's it for this witness,
- 25 your Honor.

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 1
              THE COURT: Okay. So the next witness I have would
 2
    be Smith?
              MS. PARECKI: That's right, your Honor.
 3
 4
              THE COURT: Okay. And what do you all not agree on
 5
    regarding Mr. Smith, or Dr. Smith I guess.
 6
              MS. PARECKI: Page 9, Lines 2 to 5.
 7
         (Pause)
              THE COURT: Mr. Hunnicutt, I'm inclined to sustain
 8
 9
    that. Do you have any argument on that?
10
              MR. HUNNICUTT: No, your Honor.
              THE COURT: Sustained.
11
12
              Okay, next?
              MS. PARECKI: Page 18, Lines 9 through 18.
13
14
         (Pause)
15
              THE COURT: The Court's going to overrule that.
16
              You guys aren't including like if an attorney
17
    objected or things like that, that's not going to be included
18
    in the clips, is it?
19
              MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes, your Honor. As much as we
20
    possibly -- well, I can't speak for their video technician, but
21
    I've instructed my video technician whenever he can to take out
22
    the attorneys talking and the attorney objections. As the
23
    Court I'm sure is aware, sometimes the answer and the
24
    objection --
25
              THE COURT:
                          Right.
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1
              MR. HUNNICUTT: -- are coming out at the same time,
 2
    in which case we have to keep the answer.
 3
              THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Parecki, any comments on that?
 4
              MS. PARECKI: The objections need to come out,
 5
    your Honor.
 6
              THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So we're all in
 7
    agreement they need to come out. Sometimes the people are
 8
    talking over each other and there's an answer in there and it
 9
    may be unavoidable. But, all right.
10
              Next?
11
              MS. PARECKI: Page 25, Line 9, through 26, Line 1.
              THE COURT: Twenty-five, Line 9.
12
13
         (Pause)
14
              Response, Mr. Hunnicutt?
15
              MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, your Honor, I'm not sure what
16
    the form objection is. He did not object leading and usually
17
    that's supposed to be said if that's what it is.
18
              MS. PARECKI: I can clarify the objection,
19
    your Honor.
20
              THE COURT: Go ahead.
21
              MS. PARECKI: He's asking the witness whether it's
22
    correct to understand that the primary concern of the other
23
    physicians --
24
              THE COURT: Yeah.
25
              MS. PARECKI:
                            -- was the third degree burns.
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8
1
              THE COURT: I'm going to sustain that, so that's
 2
    sustained.
 3
              Next?
              MS. PARECKI: Page 27, Line 10, through 28, Line 15.
 4
 5
              THE COURT: Twenty-seven, Line 10, through 28, Line,
 6
    what did you say, 15?
 7
              MS. PARECKI: Fifteen.
 8
              THE COURT: Okay.
 9
              MS. PARECKI: The incomplete hypothetical and the
10
    witness says that he has not seen or examined the patient for
11
    that purpose, so lack of foundation.
12
              THE COURT: The Court's going to overrule that.
13
              Next?
14
              MS. PARECKI: Page 28, Line 25, through 29, Line 10.
15
         (Pause)
16
              THE COURT: Mr. Hunnicutt?
17
              MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, there's a form objection that
18
    I -- I don't know how to respond to that. He did not object
19
    leading. And I'm just asking him whether these extensive
20
    injuries to his lower extremities would change his gait
21
    (indisc.) had he expected it would -- it did.
22
              MS. PARECKI: He said I don't know, I haven't seen
23
    him, if I'd seen him in the past several months maybe I could
24
    answer that.
25
                          So this one's specific.
                                                    The Court's
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- 1 | about the carrier rate confirmation, which is on Page 33, and
- 2 | then we go down to -- and at the top it says RCX Solutions on
- 3 this form as the carrier. I don't see any of this as
- 4 objectionable.
- 5 MS. PARECKI: It's a misrepresentation of what that
- 6 document represents.
- 7 THE COURT: Oh, well, overruled. You all can do that
- 8 through cross examination or whatever it may be. So that's
- 9 overruled.
- 10 Next?
- 11 MR. HUNNICUTT: Your Honor, the Defendants have just
- 12 | sent over --
- 13 **THE COURT:** I'm not going to address the new stuff
- 14 | just yet. We'll address that in a little bit. Because I think
- 15 | I told you if you all had agreements, I wouldn't mind you all
- 16 adding things. But I want to finish what we had started and
- 17 then we can go back and see what the Defendant is proposing.
- 18 | Okay?
- 19 MR. HUNNICUTT: That's it for Neal, your Honor.
- THE COURT: I'm sorry?
- 21 MS. PARECKI: (Indisc.)
- 22 **THE COURT:** I'm having trouble hearing you all. You
- 23 all probably both need to speak up a bit. This is a little
- 24 hard to do, doing it by phone, because we can't see each other
- 25 to kind of stop when someone else is talking and, you know, I'm

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15
1
    don't have the full deposition on -- I have -- let me see what
 2
    I have here. It doesn't appear to be Dillman's full
 3
    deposition. Hold on just a second.
 4
         (Pause)
 5
              Let's see, I only have --
 6
              MS. PARECKI: If you have Volume 1, that's what the
7
    objection goes to, your Honor.
 8
              THE COURT: On 1?
 9
              MS. PARECKI: On Volume 1.
10
              THE COURT: Okay, well, let me -- I do have that one
11
    fully.
           What page?
12
              MS. PARECKI: Page 57.
13
              THE COURT: So the objections go to Volume 1 even
14
    though --
15
              MS. PARECKI: Right, because we didn't do objections,
16
    we were waiting to see --
17
              THE COURT: Okay.
              MS. PARECKI: -- if the Plaintiffs --
18
19
              THE COURT: Okay, okay. So Page 57, where?
20
              MS. PARECKI: Line 11, your Honor, through -- just 11
21
    through 12. I think improperly suggesting that -- I mean his
22
    age is irrelevant. The fact that he's 84 --
23
              THE COURT:
                          Yeah, sustained. I don't know why his
24
    age would be relevant. Sustained.
25
              What else?
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1
              MS. PARECKI: The only other one, your Honor, that I
 2
    see I had on this is if you look at Page 73, beginning with
    Line 13, and it goes down to Page 74, Line 15 --
 3
 4
              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
 5
              MS. PARECKI: -- the number that Dr. Dillman is using
    for -- for his earnings, he actually corrects that at Page 75,
 6
 7
    Line 14 through 18. Mr. McCluggage pointed out that he had
    made a misstatement, that the 34,000 really should be 26,735.
 8
 9
    So I just wanted that part included.
10
              THE COURT: You just want to add something?
11
              MS. PARECKI:
                            That's right.
              THE COURT: That's fine. Mr. Hunnicutt, any problem
12
13
    with that?
14
              MR. HUNNICUTT: I'm trying to keep up, let me --
15
    because I didn't think they had --
16
              THE COURT: We can't hear you. I'm assuming you're
17
    on speaker phone trying to deal with all these documents, but
18
    we can't hear you. You may have to pick up your phone.
19
              MR. HUNNICUTT: Oh, yeah.
20
              THE COURT: There you go.
21
              MR. HUNNICUTT: I am -- now I've lost track of where
22
    I was.
23
              THE COURT: Okay, we are looking at Dillman depo, the
24
    first one. We are on Page 73. And that deposition is dated
25
    August 4th of last year, 2016.
                                    So that's the one we're working
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- 1 off of. Because apparently you all were waiting to do
- 2 | objections until the second depo was taken, is my
- 3 understanding.
- 4 | MR. HUNNICUTT: That's not my understanding, but I
- 5 | have no problem with dealing with this now. I thought -- well,
- 6 anyway, that's fine. They were good enough to agree to let me
- 7 | take Professor Dillman to update things and I will deal with
- 8 this. The --
- 9 THE COURT: They're just wanting to add, we're on
- 10 Page 75, there's maybe a -- he corrects himself in terms of the
- 11 amount. I'm allowing them to do it, but I didn't know if there
- 12 | was something specific you wanted to say on that.
- 13 MR. HUNNICUTT: I don't have a problem with him
- 14 | correcting that.
- 15 **THE COURT:** Okay. We're good there then. What else
- 16 on Dillman?
- 17 MS. PARECKI: That was it, your Honor.
- 18 **THE COURT:** Okay. Then --
- 19 MR. HUNNICUTT: So my record is clear, they're taking
- 20 out or adding in on Dillman on Page 75?
- 21 **THE COURT:** They're adding in on Page 75. Now, I did
- 22 exclude on Page 57, Lines 11 and 12, I believe where you ask
- 23 his age, he's 84.
- MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes.
- 25 **THE COURT:** I sustained the objection. So we're

- 1 taking out Lines 11 and 12.
- 2 MR. HUNNICUTT: Okay. He looks even older than 84,
- 3 so....
- 4 **THE COURT:** What's that?
- 5 MR. HUNNICUTT: He looks even older than 84, so
- 6 that's okay with me.
- 7 **THE COURT:** Well, okay. So then that's it on the
- 8 depos we have been addressing, as far as I can tell. So the
- 9 next thing was that the Defendants, let me find my notes,
- 10 provided new depo excerpts, and I think where we had left off
- 11 on that was you all were going to confer. If you all agreed on
- 12 adding things, fine. If there was objections, I wasn't sure
- 13 | that I was going to go forward on that because I thought that
- 14 was kind of a late filing.
- So where are you all on those depo excerpts from the
- 16 Defendants?
- 17 MR. MOYE: Yes, your Honor. Mr. Moye here. I
- 18 | believe I've gained permission from Mr. Hunnicutt for the late
- 19 | filings, but Mr. Hunnicutt specifically reserved his right to
- 20 provide objections, which I think is fair game. So I don't
- 21 | think it would be that long to rip through just a few
- 22 objections, but I understand the Court's position that if we
- 23 | couldn't agree on the entire submission you might not hear it.
- 24 But I want to make it fundamentally clear Mr. Hunnicutt did
- 25 reserve his right to lodge objections.

1 THE COURT: Right, and do you have objections, 2 Mr. Hunnicutt? MR. HUNNICUTT: I have, yes, but there are -- I'll be 3 specific. We have -- I agree with about 90 percent of what 4 5 they -- or don't object to about 90 percent of what they want to submit. That would be Butler, there are two quick 6 7 objections, and then one quick objection in Crump, one in 8 Clifton. So we're just talking about four objections, four or five objections total. THE COURT: All right, I'll look at it. So we're 10 11 going to go to Crump and what are Plaintiffs' objections there? 12 MR. HUNNICUTT: The only objection on Crump is on 13 Page -- they want to play Page 38, Lines 5 through 13, Page 38, 14 Lines 5 through 13. THE COURT: Okay, you want me to look at that? 15 16 (Pause) 17 So what's the objection? The objection is nonresponsive to --18 MR. HUNNICUTT: 19 THE COURT: Ms. Parecki or Mr. Moye, who's addressing 20 that? 21 MS. PARECKI: Your Honor, Ms. Parecki. The answer's 22 responsive. He may not like the answer, but the witness was 23 able to clarify -- he's permitted to do so in response to the 24 question. 25 The Court's going to overrule that

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20
1
    objection.
 2
              What else?
 3
              MR. HUNNICUTT: That's it for Crump.
 4
              THE COURT:
                          Okay, then --
 5
              MR. HUNNICUTT:
                              The next one --
 6
              THE COURT: -- we're going to Clifton?
 7
              MR. HUNNICUTT: So Clifton, on Page 52, Page 52,
 8
    Lines 6 through 16, there's a discussion of insurance.
 9
              MR. MOYE: Your Honor, Mr. Moye here, we'll withdraw
10
    the Clifton offer, because Mr. Clifton's going to be a live
11
    witness at trial.
12
              THE COURT: All right. Very good. So nothing else
13
    on the depositions, correct?
14
              MR. HUNNICUTT: Nothing else on Clifton. They also
15
    want -- they have some on Butler that we had two objections to.
16
              THE COURT: Okay, what are the objections?
17
              MR. HUNNICUTT: The first objection is on Page 27,
18
    Lines 17 through 22.
19
              THE COURT: Seventeen through 22, okay, let me see.
20
         (Pause)
21
              That's overruled. What else?
22
              MR. HUNNICUTT: Next one is 28, Lines 5 through 7.
23
         (Pause)
24
              THE COURT: That's overruled.
25
              MR. HUNNICUTT:
                               The next -- and that's it for Butler.
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**THE COURT:** Okay.

MR. HUNNICUTT: And we have no objections to their submission on Neal. That was it for the new submissions.

THE COURT: Okay, very good. So then let's next address the issue on the settlement with About Tyme and whether it comes in through Allen because the Defense is saying there was a shifting I guess opinions after the settlement. So Mr. Hunnicutt, did you want to address the settlement issue?

MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And I did review the briefing, so....

MR. HUNNICUTT: Okay, and I'll be brief. Based on my ruling of -- or my reading of the court case law, in order for something as prejudicial as a settlement to come into evidence, there must be a significant reason. And different Courts use different language, but we included a quote from the Seventh Circuit that it has to be a significant reason.

And the reasons are if the jury hears -- and I know Mr. Moye wants to say I just want to just let them know there was a settlement, not know the amount. And that would highly prejudice the Plaintiffs because they may be assuming that my client already got 10 million or my client already got 20 million. I mean they don't know the amount. And so it's a Pandora's box, once you open it up and the jury starts to realize that somebody already got money, whether it was from an insurance company or from a settlement, that has a horrible

1 prejudicial effect.

And then I'm faced with the Hobson's choice if the

Court decides to let them mention that there was a settlement

with About Tyme, then I have the Hobson's choice of then

waiving the terms of the settlement to let the jury know it was

only \$1 million and --

THE COURT: I don't think any amounts come in, if it even comes in. I think that the cases are pretty clear on that, that we're not supposed to do that.

Right, Mr. Moye? Or Ms. Parecki? Who's addressing that? I'm sorry.

MR. MOYE: I'm sorry, Mr. Moye. That's correct.

There's actually a Third Court case out of Judge Fisher's Court that allowed the concept but not the numbers.

MR. HUNNICUTT: And my point, your Honor, is not that I want that to happen. I'm illustrating the Pandora's box here, that once you open up the fact of the settlement, that is highly prejudicial.

Now, the key thing is to look at Roger Allen's report and his testimony. We included a little bit of his transcript. Mr. Moye was very aggressive, he was doing his job, but he was very aggressive in trying to badger Mr. Allen into saying that he changed his opinion. He actually didn't. In his report from day one, and it's fair game for them if he has a prior inconsistent statement to impeach him with his report, he said

that Ronald Brown was negligent, that About Tyme was negligent,
and RCX. He never changed his position.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Moye, you want to get into the specifics about what changed and how and --

MR. MOYE: That's right. And I'll answer the question directly. He said under oath that, quote, he has never thought About Tyme was the responsible motor carrier, that from the beginning of time he thought and always had thought that RCX Solutions was the responsible motor carrier. And that's a fundamental key change from his written report, wherein he says that this driver is driving for a About Tyme in the course and scope of his employment with About Tyme on the date of the accident. So it is a key change for him to say I never thought About Tyme was the motor carrier.

Well, question one, how were they all negligent then?
Why did you put 19 federal violations that they could only be
violating if they were the motor carrier? Why did you say that
it was a preventable accident on behalf of About Tyme when
preventability is only judged against the motor carrier?

This gentlemen was given a letter from the lawyers, which is not privileged, where they gave him the roadmap on their motion for summary judgment where he highlighted that we were the only Defendant left and About Tyme had settled the case. That occurred in June, four months after he made his written report. And then in November, when he was deposed, he

said, aw, shucks, I never thought that. Well, why did he write a 30-page report with 20 items that implicate About Tyme as the motor carrier?

So foundationally it's not a question of him saying About Tyme is not negligent, it's a question of under oath and in this trial in front of this jury he's going to say, golly, I never thought About Tyme was the motor carrier. It is belied by his report. This is fair game for cross examination. It is fair game for bias. Rule 408 is fundamentally clear, it doesn't say the word "significantly" anywhere. This is instrumental to our case. It is very important. This gentleman has to be impeached with that evidence that he put in his file, I didn't hand it to him in his depo, he had it in his file four months before he was deposed and he highlighted it.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to let the Plaintiff respond just briefly and then I'm going to make a ruling.

MR. HUNNICUTT: Okay. Briefly, your Honor, I disagree completely with Mr. Moye's interpretation of both Mr. Allen's report and his deposition. He consistently said About Tyme has a carrier license and also they were the employer and he also said that there was this arrangement -- well, the Court's read the report. I disagree. Mr. Moye has an agenda to try to make it sound like Mr. Allen is changing his opinion. He did not.

What he's referring to was not a roadmap that we gave

- 1 him. We gave Mr. Allen both the summary judgment that the
- 2 Defendant filed with all the evidence and the summary judgment
- 3 response. We also gave him the pleadings. We gave him our
- 4 position and we gave him the answers. I mean we just gave all
- 5 of that information. So the implication that he was being
- 6 given some roadmap to follow I disagree with.
- 7 THE COURT: All right. Actually it's a delicate
- 8 issue and fine line probably, but I think the settlement
- 9 information is appropriate for impeachment here.
- 10 Now, you all need to discuss the parameters and then
- 11 | I don't know if we do some sort of limiting instruction or how
- 12 | we handle that, because it is a sensitive issue and I have not
- 13 | tried this type of case before or had that issue. So you all
- 14 | need to discuss that further as to how it's going to be done,
- 15 | what we need to do. Any comments on that or you all want to
- 16 discuss that further between yourselves?
- 17 MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, can I ask the Court that this
- 18 | issue of settlement, since it's only for impeachment, not be
- 19 | mentioned in voir dire or opening statement and it be saved
- 20 until Mr. Allen is on the stand? Because there are ways it can
- 21 be brought up --
- 22 THE COURT: Yeah, I am concerned about the extent of
- 23 what Defendant is going to try to do with this. I think it's
- 24 appropriate for impeachment of the expert and I think we need
- 25 | to limit it to that and not just be injecting it over and over

through the trial, which could lead to confusion and problems
with the jury. So that's why I'm saying I think there needs to
be some discussion about exactly how it's going to be used.

MR. MOYE: And, your Honor, Mr. Moye here. I pride myself on following the rules and I pride myself on trying to do the right thing. I will not bring up a settlement with About Tyme in voir dire or in opening. In opening I will mention that About Tyme was sued, because I have to, but not that they settled or anything else. I'm free to admit that I'm not their lawyer, which I have to do. But I will not mention the word "settlement" once in my opening or once in my voir dire.

THE COURT: Okay. But I think there still needs -thank you for that. I think there still needs to be specific
discussion and maybe between you two first and then with the
Court before we start the trial as to how it's going to come in
and we're going to limit it to that.

MR. MOYE: I think -- Mr. Moye. I think that's fair. Because frankly if Mr. Allen testifies and says, you know what, I was wrong, I think they're both the motor carriers, or About Tyme was the motor carrier and there was a negligent brokerage of the load between RCX. I don't know what he's going to say. But if he says I always said About Tyme is the motor carrier, then I think that might implicate -- my needs in this case, I just -- I don't want to pin myself to that, but that's kind of

- 1 | the philosophy of what I think is relevant here.
- 2 MR. HUNNICUTT: So that I -- this is Hunnicutt. So I
- 3 understand, your Honor, we are to confer about how -- when and
- 4 how the settlement discussion occurs with the witness,
- 5 Mr. Allen, and also before anybody goes talking about
- 6 settlement in front of the jury in any way we approach the
- 7 bench and talk --
- 8 THE COURT: Well, no, we discuss it before we even
- 9 start the trial. You all discuss it between yourselves between
- 10 | now and Monday morning. Before the jury comes up we will have
- 11 | a discussion on the record as to exactly how it's going to be
- 12 used. I'm really going to pin the Defense down on this,
- 13 | because I don't want to create a lot of problems.
- 14 MR. MOYE: I think that's fair and, frankly, what I
- 15 | was referring to is if we get a good one I want to keep it too.
- 16 So I hear where you're coming from.
- 17 **THE COURT:** Okay. So you all are going to discuss it
- 18 and when we gather on Monday morning before the jury comes up
- 19 | we're going to discuss details about how that's going to be
- 20 approached. Correct?
- 21 MR. MOYE: We will, yes.
- 22 **THE COURT:** Okay. All right, then the next thing,
- 23 | you all were going to discuss expert testimony in terms of
- 24 questions of law. Have you all discussed that?
- 25 MR. MOYE: We have not. We have been dealing with

other things, frankly, and that got lost on us. I think we could certainly add it to the agenda and time to discuss in advance of trial along with the settlement conversation.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything on that, Mr. Hunnicutt?

MR. HUNNICUTT: I agree. I think we're both getting
on the same page slowly but surely and we will have a long
discussion before Monday morning.

THE COURT: Okay on that issue.

The next thing is the charge. You all submitted and then did a revised proposed instructions to the jury, so let me grab that. And I think the issue is just simply how are we going to submit the question about the arrangement and my inclination is to simply follow the statute.

So I will take, Mr. Hunnicutt, if you want to address that issue.

MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes, your Honor. I think one of the primary differences between -- well, I think it needs to be a broad form submission. I think we need to not burden it with a lot of extra legalese. I think the Court is going to ultimately decide the question of law, obviously. So what we need is just a factual determination from the jury and under the statute -- we actually have included in our proposed charge what was the Defendants' proposed question originally, and that is simply at the time of the collision between Brown and Puga was RCX using motor vehicles it does not own to transport

- 1 property under an arrangement with Ronald Brown.
- 2 THE COURT: And that's kind of what's set out in
- 3 | 49 -- Title 49, Section 14102, right?
- 4 MR. HUNNICUTT: Right. The -- well, the pertinent
- 5 part.
- 6 **THE COURT:** Right.
- 7 MR. HUNNICUTT: Now, I think the Defendants are
- 8 adding -- in one of their versions they want to add basically
- 9 all of the points that they included in their summary judgment.
- 10 | I don't think -- I don't believe that is appropriate for the
- 11 jury for them to make their factual determination.
- 12 **THE COURT:** Mr. Moye?
- MR. MOYE: Yes, ma'am -- or yes, your Honor. Yeah, I
- 14 don't disagree with half of Mr. Hunnicutt's suggestion. The
- 15 | problem is -- and we obviously withdrew this so, you know,
- 16 | we're not saying we agree to it.
- 17 **THE COURT:** Right.
- 18 MR. MOYE: The problem is the obtuseness of the
- 19 question is simply using motor vehicles it does not own to
- 20 transport under an arrangement with Ronald Brown, under that
- 21 definition every single broker would be on the hook for
- 22 statutory employer liability because there's no mention of
- 23 | lease. In your Honor's most recent clarification you mentioned
- 24 | that the arrangement had to be at least lease-like. So it
- 25 | can't just be bald-faced arrangement, because in the motor

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carrier world there's about a thousand different arrangements
that would lead to statutory employer liability if this is the
charge question.
          What we did in trying to keep with what we think is
the clarification the Judge offered us, is we have a definition
of lease that you referred to as means a contract or
arrangement, I don't think we can be deprived of that
definition, in which the owner grants the use of equipment,
with or without a driver, for a specified period of time, an
authorized carrier for use and regulate transportation
property.
          THE COURT: We're not taking you down. You're
talking too fast and you're --
                    Okay, I'm sorry.
          MR. MOYE:
          THE COURT: -- coming across mumbled, so the
record's --
          MR. MOYE:
                    Sure.
          THE COURT: -- not going to be clear.
                    My apologies for that. What we did,
          MR. MOYE:
you'll see in our proposed question on Page 9, is we actually
took statutorily the lease language, which I think is phrased
from your motion to reconsider order where you said that the
arrangement has to be lease-like. And we argued that it has to
be a lease and I understand that you've made some decisions on
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that, but you certainly have said it has to be at least lease-

1 like, it's a statutory issue on a lease.

THE COURT: I know, but that's the issue I guess or the question, what does the statute require in terms of an arrangement. I'm not going to turn it into what the statute requires when you have a written contract and you should specify all these terms. I don't think that would be appropriate. But I have not identified in the statute what might be helpful in terms of an arrangement.

MR. MOYE: And there's not any. The problem is there's not a single case that references an arrangement after the lease. And you'll see, Judge, because, I think, again I'm trying to be a good steward of what -- a good lawyer for doing the right thing, I didn't put in our proposed question that it had to be in writing, it had to be in the cab, in had to be this. I specifically limited it to defining the lease as a contract or arrangement implicated an ownership in the transport and who owns what and that did RCX Solutions have a lease with About Tyme whereby RCX Solutions was using About Tyme's transport equipment to transport the load Mr. Brown was hauling at the time of the accident with Mr. Puga and then literally three sentences defining lease from the statute.

THE COURT: Mr. Hunnicutt?

MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, your Honor, we cited the cases previously, I know the Court cited them also in their order, that you don't have to have a written lease. So I don't want

- 1 there to be an implication, and I think there's a potential for
- 2 | a confusing argument with the jury, because we really are in
- 3 the shade of gray between law and fact. My preference is to
- 4 keep this not legal for the jury and just get the factual
- 5 determination from them.
- 6 THE COURT: I know, but what's going to be helpful to
- 7 | the jury in terms of -- I couldn't find anything. The statute,
- 8 Mr. Moye said, there's nothing. When we talk about is there
- 9 this arrangement, is that it? We just submit that question
- 10 | with no really guidance? I'm not sure. I don't think there's
- 11 anything out there to help us on it.
- 12 But I agree. I mean I've repeatedly said in the
- 13 orders written agreement not required. I understand that's
- 14 typically what happens. But I don't think it's required,
- 15 otherwise people could get out of this situation by not having
- 16 a written agreement. So --
- 17 MR. MOYE: And then that's what the Ninth Court found
- 18 | in the case you cited, and that's fine, but they had an oral
- 19 | lease in that case. There was still a lease in that case,
- 20 | there just wasn't a written lease in that case.
- 21 So there still has to, across the landscape of every
- 22 | single case on this issue, has to be a lease. And you'll see
- 23 | in my --
- 24 **THE COURT:** I know, I'm just trying to get to how do
- 25 | we get there without --

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MR. MOYE:
                    Well, I think our submission defines the
lease that borrows the logic from your motion to reconsider.
So I purposely didn't put has to be a written lease, has to be
an oral lease. I mean, frankly, it has to be a contract or
arrangement that is a lease. And your words I think were very
astute, it has to be lease-like. Unless there's --
          THE COURT: Well, I was -- I'm talking without a lot
of guidance when I've been doing some of this work, right?
Because, as you said, there's not -- there are not cases out
there addressing this particular matter.
          MR. MOYE:
                    That's right, and I think both sides
filings are filed without a lot of guidance either.
                                                     So you're
not the only, you know, rower in this boat sadly.
          MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, I think one of the -- and I'm
looking at the statute right now and I think that the -- I
think there's just enough language in the statute to submit
arrangement. If we're going to insert the word "lease," then
my concern is that we should have in there at some point like
lease means a contract or arrangement, comma, written or oral,
       Because when most people hear that there's a lease --
          THE COURT:
                      Right.
          MR. HUNNICUTT: -- they're looking for a document,
because, you know, most people's experience with a lease is
with getting an apartment or leasing a car and there's always a
document.
           So I think the Court would have to put in oral or
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1 written.

THE COURT: So lease or arrangement, comma, written or oral, comma, that might kind of help here?

MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, the concept we tried to include in our question, which is just that there's an arrangement between Brown and RCX to use a motor vehicle they did not own to transport property under an arrangement.

THE COURT: Right, and I think under the statute --

MR. HUNNICUTT: Absolutely.

THE COURT: -- it only uses arrangement. But the Defense is right, it's not just any arrangement, you know, it's certain situations.

MR. MOYE: Judge, if I could chime in. My definition of lease could be read lease means a contract or arrangement, comma, written or oral, comma, in which the owner grants blabblab-blab. So I don't dispute Mr. Hunnicutt wants to have no indication of lease meaning what a jury would familiarize themselves, like a landlord situation that has to be in writing. As much as I disagree with the Ninth Court's case, it's there. I've got to live with it. So if written or oral needs to be added to ours, I would have no objection.

MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, I do have an objection to -- I mean the statute made a point of saying lease or arrangement and I think the reason is --

THE COURT: Where does the statute say lease or

- arrangement? Where does it say that? Because when I'm looking at 14102, the title says leased motor vehicles, but if you just look at the language there it just talks about an arrangement.
  - MR. HUNNICUTT: You're right, your Honor. I
    misspoke. I'm sorry. But my point is that I think the
    Legislature specifically wanted to make it broad enough to
    prevent a situation where a company wanting to do an end-run
    around the DOT regs and responsibility, or an end-run around
    the statutory employer doctrine, just have an arrangement
    and --
    - THE COURT: Right, and we're past that. I mean at least from, not the Defendants' view, but the way the Court has ruled throughout the case about an arrangement being enough.

      We're just trying to figure out how do we submit this to the jury where it's fair to everyone.

MR. MOYE: Yeah, and, Judge, we can't away from the lease definition under the Code of Federal Regulations. I certainly haven't reviewed the legislative history, I'm not buddies with any representative 60 years ago that wrote this, so I don't know Mr. Hunnicutt's suggestion about what they thought they were doing. But the words are the words and lease is defined as a contract or arrangement and that's a lease and -- the arrangement issue, literally if we just submit did they have an arrangement and that's it, then this case is going to get tried twice because every single brokerage in the

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1 | country would be a statutory employer.
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THE COURT: Right, and there are a lot of issues in
this case that will maybe likely have to be tried twice. This
is not the only one.

MR. MOYE: Yeah.

THE COURT: So, you know, you all can throw that around all you want. There's a lot of issues that are --

MR. MOYE: I understand and I didn't mean --

THE COURT: -- appealable issues. You know what I'm

10 saying?

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11 MR. MOYE: Yeah. I did and I didn't mean to come 12 across disrespectful by saying that --

THE COURT: I didn't take it as disrespectful. I'm just saying if we're going to start talking about appealable matters, there's a lot here --

MR. MOYE: That's right.

THE COURT: -- that can be appealed. So --

MR. MOYE: But it has to be a lease -- there has to be a lease that has to be lease-like. If we're going to try the case that we're a broker and there's an arrangement and we shook hands once and we exchanged, you know, a -- you know, we interchanged the trailer, if that's enough for an arrangement to find liability in this case as a statutory employer, that is fundamentally against every single case on the planet.

MR. HUNNICUTT: I disagree. This is Hunnicutt. On

- 1 the -- just interpret the statutory construction. I think the 2 Court rightly pointed out, when you construct what this particular section means, if a term is used like lease, then 3 you look for the definition of lease. The term "lease" isn't 4 5 used, except in the title. 6 Now, an arrangement has to be with a company who are 7 going to -- who don't own the property but make an arrangement 8 with another person to transport it. That's limited. 9 you come within the statute, then you're supposed to have a 10 written lease and that's where you spell out the 11 responsibilities of the parties. 12 When you look at what a lease means in terms of just 13 somebody using somebody else's property and then making an 14 arrangement that's for the pecuniary benefit of both sides, 15 that's a lease. But --16 MR. MOYE: Absolutely not --17 (Voices overlap) 18 **THE COURT:** We're not taking you all because you all 19 talking over each other, so we're not -- there's no record on 20 what you all are doing right now. 21 MR. MOYE: I was disrespectful, so I'll let 22 Mr. Hunnicutt finish. 23
  - MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, I think we're both just beating a dead horse and all of us have not enough guidance from the

- 1 | safe thing to do is to track the language of 49 U.S.C. 14102,
- 2 because that is the fact question that the Court needs from the
- 3 | jury that the Court then applies the law that has been fully
- 4 briefed several times in this case to determine if he was a
- 5 | statutory employee. I think our question follows more closely
- 6 | what -- because we just lifted the language right out of the
- 7 statute about an arrangement.
- 8 MR. MOYE: And, Judge, it's titled leased -- it's
- 9 | titled leased vehicles, so their question (indisc.) of a lease.
- 10 We'll be trying a different case than we've done in discovery
- 11 | if Mr. Allen gets to sit up there and says, you know what, they
- 12 | were the broker and there was an arrangement, so you lose.
- 13 | That's the problem with their submission, is it ignores the
- 14 basic issue there has to be a lease, whether we call it written
- 15 or oral or otherwise, it has to be there. And again, I am
- 16 | beating a dead horse, because I will indulge Mr. Hunnicutt's
- 17 | earlier suggestion of accepting what we suggested on a lease
- 18 definition and clarifying it as oral or written. I think
- 19 | that's the best way to charge this jury.
- 20 MR. HUNNICUTT: And I don't want to be misunderstood
- 21 to say that I'm accepting their way of submitting it. I'm just
- 22 | pointing out if we don't go with ours, which I still think we
- 23 | should just follow the language of the statute, and you start
- 24 | throwing in the word "lease," then you have to throw in oral or
- 25 written.

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THE COURT: And the Defense doesn't have a problem with throwing in written or oral. They may and they may object to it formally, but I'm trying to get to a practical working proposed question so that you all kind of know before you start your trial. MR. MOYE: Your Honor, and again I know I have to make a record, but frankly if it -- in our Proposed Question Number 1 on Page 9, if it read lease means a contract or arrangement, comma, written or oral, comma, if that's added to that I would not object. THE COURT: Mr. Hunnicutt, you want to look at that some more? MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, I still don't think that they should be defining lease and using the word lease, because it's not in the statute. So I disagree that we should use their question. THE COURT: Okay. But then we need to do something with arrangement, I would think. I agree, the statutory language discusses an arrangement. But then what do we do with that? Mr. Hunnicutt? It's a little bit -- I'm drawing a little bit from Mr. Hunnicutt's comments earlier when we objected to the word "statutory employer" and he said that's a term of art in the industry, there's not a single human being on this earth

- 1 that refers to leased drivers or leased equipment as arranged 2 drivers. So every expert in this case refers to it as a lease, 3 the regulations refer to it as a lease, the jury needs to be 4 charged whether there was a release -- a lease. 5 THE COURT: Anything further, Mr. Hunnicutt? MR. HUNNICUTT: Yeah, I'm just -- I'm just --6 7 THE COURT: It's kind of a difficult issue, so.... just would like for you all to have some sort of proposal, it 8 9 won't be concrete, but before you start your case. I think 10 it's important because of all the factual, the details, I 11 guess, that are going to be presented through witnesses or 12 experts. And there's nothing out there, you all haven't found 13 any jury instructions from other Courts on this issue or 14 anything like that? 15 We will look, your Honor. MR. MOYE: 16 MR. HUNNICUTT: We have not been able to find any. 17 I've actually -- I found cases where the Court ruled as a 18 matter of law that there was a statutory employee and then 19 instructed the jury that they were a statutory employee, but I 20 haven't -- we haven't been able to find where the fact -- where 21 a fact question is submitted to the jury. THE COURT: Any suggestions, Mr. Moye?
- 22
- 23 We will look. We have looked. MR. MOYE: I will 24 have my smarter than I am plaintiff's lawyer -- or appellate 25 lawyer, rather, take another look. But my prediction is this

is probably the only case ever that -- where a settlement was made with a purported motor carrier where the case has been made against someone else as a statutory employer.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUNNICUTT: I doubt it's the only case. It's just it hasn't -- none have been published that we could find.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me see what else there is to discuss. I think that was it. I know some of the rulings today will affect some of the motions in limine and maybe the exhibits that were left hanging. I don't know if we need to address anything specifically on the motions in limine and the exhibits.

MR. MOYE: I don't think that was addressed, frankly. There is, if the Judge would afford me two minutes, there is one guidance I want to speak. I know that "insurance," "collateral source," doesn't come into evidence, but the one issue though in this case, again being a DOT case, you know, our argument is that About Tyme is the responsible motor carrier. Our argument is the facts are that we hired them because they had operating authority and the requisite financial responsibility. I think that's relevant for me to be able to discuss without using the word insurance, without using the words minimal limits, without saying insured for a million dollars, without saying commercial automobile policy, but to be able to say that we hired About Tyme and we did research on

1 About Tyme, we brokered the load to a motor carrier that had 2 proper authority and the requisite financial responsibility, I 3 don't want to draw an objection to that during trial, I wanted to bring it out to the Court's attention now. Because, again, 4 5 these DOT cases are unique, because if you didn't have -- About 6 Tyme did not have that financial responsibility, there's a 7 better argument to be made that I leased that driver. But the fact they do have financial responsibility supports the 8 9 argument that this was a brokered client to a motor carrier. 10 THE COURT: Mr. Hunnicutt? 11 MR. HUNNICUTT: I think that interjecting insurance 12 is too prejudicial, especially when you combine that with the 13 fact that they're going to be able to talk about a settlement 14 with About Tyme. The --15 THE COURT: But he has to be able to talk about 16 the -- I guess for lack of a better term, the arrangement and 17 what's required and what needs to be done per DOT, right? 18 MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, but that's the interesting 19 thing. When you look at the deposition testimony of the 20 Defense employees, they never do a broker deal through RCX 21 Solutions. And so -- and that's why the paperwork is all 22 That's why there are some carrier documents they messed up.

used and some broker documents they used. I think the truth of

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actually totally unaware that this deal went down.

Chain, but they knew that Supply Chain's broker license was suspended. They usually used all of Supply Chain's documents whenever they had a broker deal, but they didn't do that. And then -- so they're using the company that's not a broker, so you've got this conglomeration of mixed up documents, some carrier, some broker, and they actually -- the people that were supposed to have done a broker deal and checked the things about financial responsibility, when I asked them they were

Randy Clifton had equipment break down. He had this deal that had to get done. He's the only one that did it. The other people that usually do the broker deals weren't aware of it, didn't know he had this arrangement with Ronald Brown.

Yes, they have proof in their file because of other dealings with Ronald Brown that he had financial responsibility, but they weren't following the company's usual procedures for a broker deal. So I don't buy that whole argument.

MR. MOYE: Judge, the argument is -- I mean that's his position, that's for the jury to decide. We produced in discovery 47 pieces of paper that show that they brokered other deals, five of which to About Tyme with a contract with About Tyme that says they're the carrier and we're the broker, and in doing so we had to determine whether they had authority and the requisite financial responsibility under the Motor Carrier Act.

I'm not going to put their insurance policy in evidence. I'm

- 1 | not going to call it an insurance policy. But I have to be
- 2 | able to call it they had the requisite financial responsibility
- 3 under the Act. I have to.
- 4 THE COURT: Yeah, I don't know how you get around
- 5 that, Mr. Hunnicutt.
- 6 MR. HUNNICUTT: Well, I think, just like the
- 7 settlement issue, the way he talks about it needs to be
- 8 | important, especially when settlement is going to be able to be
- 9 used for impeachment. I mean I can see a line of examination
- 10 putting in there the references to insurance and settlement at
- 11 | the same time he's talking to Mr. Allen that creates a very
- 12 prejudicial and confusing picture for the jury. And especially
- 13 | if my hands are tied and I don't get to tell the jury that it
- 14 | was only \$1 million. I think that's highly prejudicial.
- 15 **THE COURT:** Mr. Moye?
- 16 MR. MOYE: There's just no way to try it -- I mean
- 17 | it's the motor carrier rules, Judge. I mean --
- 18 **THE COURT:** Yeah, I know, and I've already said that.
- 19 | I just -- again, the concern is how you're going to use it, how
- 20 often, and what you're trying to do with it. But we've kind of
- 21 already discussed that with the settlement issue.
- 22 MR. MOYE: That's right and we'll put it on the
- 23 agenda for me and Mr. Hunnicutt to discuss for Monday. I am
- 24 | certainly aware of his concerns. I am aware of trying to try a
- 25 | clean case as well. I don't think I'm asking for too much rope

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    on the scope I've offered thus far on both those issues, but
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    I'll be glad to discuss it further with opposing counsel.
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              THE COURT: Okay. Here's the deal. I'm having an
    issue obviously with how we're going to submit this
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    lease/arrangement matter to the jury and I kind of think it's
    important for you all to know. Obviously it wouldn't be set in
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    stone till the end of the case as to what's going to be
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    submitted to the jury. But let me look at that a little bit
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    more. Are you guys available around 2:00 to reconvene and
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    discuss that some more?
              MR. HUNNICUTT: Actually, your Honor, I've got a
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    post-judgment hearing that I cannot move and I would not --
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay.
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              MR. HUNNICUTT: -- be available this afternoon.
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              THE COURT: All right. The other thing on the
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    charge, I mean there's not going to be any objection from the
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    Plaintiff to submit settling Defendant About Tyme, is there?
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    Because I think that's appropriate. But Mr. Hunnicutt?
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              MR. HUNNICUTT: I reserve the right to object at the
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    end, but that's all right, your Honor.
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              THE COURT: Okay. So do you all want to discuss the
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    submission further or what are we doing for the trial on
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    Monday?
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MR. MOYE: Well, I will say this, I think in our -- we think (glitch in audio) submitted both under Chapter 33, but

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- also, just like Mr. Hunnicutt just argued, if they're negligent the jury's free to consider their negligence.
- 3 **THE COURT:** Right.
- MR. MOYE: We put, just as a placeholder, Mr. Puga,
  frankly I think it will come down in the charge conference
  whether there's any evidence of any negligence --
- 7 **THE COURT:** Right.

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- MR. MOYE: -- in mitigation for recreational drug 9 usage affecting his prescription drug plan, if there's -- if 10 the police officer stands up and says, hey, I did a 11 reconstruction and he was going 80 miles an hour in the rain 12 and he couldn't avoid the crash, I don't know if any of that 13 will happen, I predict it won't, but I didn't want to get a 14 waiver, so it's a placeholder only. If that assuages 15 Mr. Hunnicutt's concern as to why we did that, that's why we 16 did that.
  - THE COURT: That's fine. That will just depend on the evidence at the trial as to what's going to be submitted.

    But I was just asking generally about About Tyme. I think it would be, under the law, Texas law I guess, normally the settling person is submitted. So I was just making sure there wasn't some significant objection or something I had missed there.
- MR. HUNNICUTT: The only other thing that I would
  mention, your Honor, as a matter of form, and depending on the

the charge that we don't have to nail down until --

case and the way the case is presented and developed, I'm not sure that they would be entitled to two different blanks. In other words, one for Ronald Brown and one for About Tyme. But those are things that we don't have to -- those are parts of

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HUNNICUTT: -- the charge conference at the end.

THE COURT: I agree. Because you can work with that through the trial or whatever, it's not going to affect. But how we submit the lease or arrangement matter I think does kind of dictate how you proceed with your trial. That's why I'm trying to pin that down in a way that's fair to both of you with a little heads up as to what might be submitted, because obviously I reserve the right to make the final instructions at the end of the evidence.

MR. HUNNICUTT: Sure.

THE COURT: So I'm just trying to -- but I'd like to look at that a little bit more. I'm just not sure when we can confer again.

MR. HUNNICUTT: I could make myself available anytime tomorrow, if the Court -- well, I just -- I'm going to be driving in a car with a cell phone and then I'm going to be in a hearing that every hearing in that case post-judgment has been like three hours, so it might --

THE COURT: Oh, yeah, can we just maybe for like

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    20-30 minutes tomorrow morning at 9:00?
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              Mr. Moye?
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              MR. MOYE:
                         That would work for us, your Honor.
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    you.
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay. Mr. Hunnicutt?
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              MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes, your Honor.
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              THE COURT:
                          Okay. So why don't we reconvene at 9:00
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    tomorrow, really only to address the issue of how we're going
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    to submit lease/arrangement to the jury. You all are going to
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    discuss before Monday and we'll talk about Monday morning then
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    how the Defense is going to use the settlement with About Tyme
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    and maybe the financial responsibility matter that they're
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    required to have, how the Defense is going to use that. And
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    then you all are going to discuss expert testimony in terms of
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    legal questions, correct?
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              MR. HUNNICUTT: Yes, your Honor,
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              THE COURT:
                         Okay. And then anytime -- I know it's
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    probably not likely, but, Mr. Moye, you said you might get your
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    appellate guys looking a little bit more about submissions on
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    these type of cases from any other Courts.
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              MR. MOYE:
                         They look forward to the challenge and I
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    will set them loose.
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              THE COURT: All right, we'll see you tomorrow morning
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    at 9:00.
              Thanks.
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         (Counsel thank the Court)
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(This proceeding was adjourned at 10:04 a.m.)
CERTIFICATION
I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
Join / Julian August 7, 2017_
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